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Abstract : 
Theoretical and empirical works on job search often neglect the role of unemployed environment like 
spatial constraints meets while searching for a job. This paper proposes a job search model where both the spatial 
search area and the reservation wage are assumed to be endogenous. We exploit data from a French survey 
conducted by Research Direction of Employment Ministry (DARES) to estimate the structural parameters of the 
model. First we estimate the choice of the search area, i.e. the choice between passive (receiving job offers 
through the local public employment agencies) and active strategies (extending the job search area using others 
search channels). Using a bivariate probit model, we highlight that this choice depends significantly on 
individual attributes and spatial constraints and that it affects job quality. Besides, the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives is not rejected. Secondly, using Gamma duration model we treat both individual and unobservable 
heterogeneity and the multiple destinations after unemployment (long-term jobs, short-term jobs and subsidised 
jobs). Moreover, estimations are made on sub-samples in which individuals are homogenous according to their 
level of diploma and their situation towards the unemployment insurance. Controlling for unobservable 
heterogeneity and selection bias, the econometric results show that the passive strategy is more efficient for low-
graduated people accessing a subsidised job. However, the active strategy is more efficient for high-graduated 
individuals accessing a full-term or a short-term job. 
 
JEL Classification : J61, J64, C3 
Key Words : Job Search – Spatial Constraints – Unemployment Duration – Search Strategies 
 
Résumé : 
Parmi les multiples facteurs explicatifs de l’hétérogénéité des transitions individuelles vers l’emploi, les 
études économétriques ont porté peu d’attention aux effets des effets liés à l’environnement de la recherche, 
comme notamment les contraintes spatiales supportées par les chercheurs d’emploi (éloignement des zones de 
concentration des emplois comme des agences publiques de placement notamment).  
Tel est l’enjeu de cet article où l’on étudie l’influence du choix de l’horizon spatial de la recherche et 
des contraintes spatiales rencontrées au cours de la recherche sur la durée de l’épisode de chômage. On estime 
pour cela la vraisemblance associée à un modèle structurel de recherche dans lequel le salaire de réserve comme 
la décision d’augmentation de la distance de prospection sont endogènes. A partir des données individuelles de 
l’enquête « Trajectoire des Demandeurs d’emploi » de la DARES, un traitement économétrique préalable de 
l’endogénéité et de la non indépendance des choix alternatifs non pertinents permet de contrôler ces sources de 
biais lors de l’estimation de la fonction de vraisemblance associée à l’expression du taux de hasard. La procédure 
d’estimation retenue à ce niveau permet de contrôler l’hétérogénéité des issues selon la nature du contrat 
d’embauche (CDI, CDD, contrats aidés), le niveau de formation et l’indemnisation chômage. Correction faite 
des sources d’hétérogénéité inobservable, les résultats font apparaître d’une part que l’arbitrage opéré par le 
chercheur d’emploi entre stratégie active de recherche (élargir son horizon spatial de recherche) et stratégie 
passive (recevoir des offres d’emploi de l’ANPE) exerce un effet particulièrement discriminant quant à la qualité 
de l’emploi retrouvé (CDI, CDD, Contrat Aidé).  
Mots clés : Théorie de la recherche d’emploi, Transitions vers l’emploi, économétrie des modèles de durée, 
contraintes spatiales  
Classification JEL : J61, J64 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Finding an explanation for the success or the failure of individual job search has been 
one of the main research programmes of labour economists during the last three decades. This 
study aims at contributing to this literature by questioning the potential impact of individual 
spatial constraints on the job search efficiency.  
Theoretical and empirical works on job search focus commonly on the effects of 
individual factors, public employment policies or unemployment insurance. They often 
neglect the role of the search environment, in particular the role of spatial characteristics. 
Some recent studies yet try to link job search theory and spatial economics. One issue that has 
attracted some attention is the effect of the spatial mismatch (Kain, 1992), in particular in the 
United States. Holzer, Ihandfled, Sjoquist (1994) model the impact of search distance in a 
static job search model and estimating a reduced-form duration model. They conclude that the 
localisation of the black unemployed people in town centre whereas jobs are concentrated in 
suburbs explain that these people face higher search costs and stay longer in unemployment. 
Rogers (1997) assumes that the distances to jobs can affect both the offer rate, the commuting 
costs and the search costs. But, as the distance to jobs can have multiple and opposite impacts 
on unemployment duration, the estimation of reduced-form duration models does not allow 
the author to conclude about these impacts. 
Therefore, a more complete study to evaluate the impact of spatial mismatch seems to 
be the one of Van den Berg and Gorter (1997). Their main contribution is to estimate a 
structural job search model characterised by a non-stationary environment, in which workers 
trade off between wages and commuting time. It is also one of the rare contributions focused 
on Europe. They indeed exploit a Dutch data set which contains very rich information, in 
particular on individual reservation wages. Their results highlight that the individual trade-off 
is influenced by three types of covariates : individuals attributes, family characteristics and 
environmental factors. For female, the number of children dwindles the search area and the 
probability of accepting high commuting time. An additional child raises the marginal wage 
claim up to $80 for a commuting time equal to two hours per day. Besides, the town size is 
positively related with the commuting time, probably because of more developed transport 
modes. 
Finally, in the line of Nickell (1998), Gardner, Pierre and Oswald (2001) and Oswald 
(1997), as they affect the moving cost from job to job, spatial factors like the distribution of 
home-ownership can be viewed as one of "the missing pieces" to explain the rise of 
unemployment in Europe. 
All these studies then campaign for the introduction of spatial constraints in the 
analysis of job search efficiency. Here, we contribute to this literature by modelling and 
estimating the impact of the choice of the spatial search area on unemployment duration in 
France. The case of France is particularly interesting since the unemployed people face two 
major search strategies. The first one, qualified as a passive search strategy, consists in 
searching through the local public employment agencies, called ALE (Agences Locales pour 
l'Emploi). ALE provide free job offers but only localised in a determined area: the one that is 
administratively controlled by the ALE. The second strategy, called active strategy, consists 
in extending the search area beyond the ALE area, using alternative search methods (market 
methods, private employment agencies or networks). In such an institutional context, spatial 
constraints can explain the choice of search strategies and search efficiency. 
Section 2 presents a job search model that allows for spatial choices. In this model, the 
job offer rate depends positively on the two search strategies. Both reservation wage and the 
search area are assumed to be endogenous. As the equilibrium properties lead us to an 
ambiguous effect of the spatial search area on the exit rate from unemployment, the structural 
parameters of the model are estimated. 
Section 3 describes the data. We exploit data from a French survey called Trajectoires 
des Demandeurs d'Emploi (TDE), conducted by the Research Direction of Employment 
Ministry (DARES). It concerns people who became unemployed in 1995 and interviewed 
each year until 1998. This survey provides large information both on individual characteristic, 
spatial factors, search strategies and unemployment duration. Our analysis focuses on the first 
search period observed in the data set. In section 3 we also estimate the choice of the search 
area, i.e. the choice between passive and active strategies. Using a bivariate probit model, we 
highlight that this choice depends significantly on individual attributes and spatial constraints. 
Besides, the independence of irrelevant alternatives is not rejected. In the light of these results 
and to avoid selectivity bias, estimated probabilities of using each strategies are computed and 
introduced as components of the offer rate. 
Section 4 details the estimation method used to evaluate the structural parameters of the 
model and comments the main results. Our specification assumptions allow us to treat both 
individual and unobservable heterogeneity and the multiple destinations after unemployment. 
Three independent destinations are analysed : long-term jobs, short-term jobs and subsidised 
jobs. Estimations are also made on sub-samples in which individuals are homogenous 
according to their level of diploma and their situation towards the unemployment insurance. 
This specification allows us to make a significant contribution to the empirical literature on 
the link between spatial economics and job search theory. Indeed, the choice of the spatial 
search area, taking into account its selectivity, affects significantly not only the individual 
unemployment duration but also the job quality. Nevertheless, the impact of the two search 
strategies is found to be strongly heterogeneous. The passive strategy, limiting the search area 
to the ALE zone, is more efficient for low-graduated people accessing a public measure. Yet 
it can increase the unemployment duration for high-graduated people. In the opposite, the 
active strategy accelerates the exit from unemployment for all the unemployed people. In 
addition, this strategy seems to be more efficient to access a long-term job. 
The final section concludes. 
 
2. The model 
2.1. Notations and assumptions 
 
Our model is inspired from the job search models with endogenous search effort  
(Mortensen, 1986; Fougère, Pradel, Roger, 1996) but we assume here that both reservation 
wage and search distance are endogenous. Two states are considered : unemployment and 
employment. There is no on-the-job search. The search environment is assumed to be 
stationary. Let r be the interest rate. Any offered wage, w, is viewed as a random sample from 
a cumulative distribution ( )wF . Individuals are risk neutral and homogenous except 
concerning the search behaviour.  
Indeed, two search strategies can be adopted (and potentially combined) : a passive 
one and an active one. By using the passive strategy, unemployed people can receive offers 
from the local public employment agency (ALE) with an intensity λ0 . This intensity is 
assumed to be higher when people live near the ALE or the jobs localisation. If x denotes the 
distance between home and ALE and y those to the nearest job area, we then have  : 00 <
∂
∂
x
λ
 
and 0<
∂
∂
y
oλ . Using the passive strategy, unemployed people limit their search distance to the 
area administratively controlled by the local unemployment service. The active strategy 
allows them to search beyond this restrictive zone, mobilising other search channels like 
market methods or networks. Let d  be the endogenous search distance associated to the active 
strategy.  In the line of Holzer, Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1994), this search distance ( d ) is 
supposed to be higher than the commuting distance in the previous job (noted 1−d ) or strictly 
positive in case of the first enter in the labour market. So we have : dd <<
−10 . 
As the passive strategy provides free job offers to unemployed people, search costs 
depend only on the search distance d. The cost function is defined as follows :  
( ) α+= 1AddCR , where 10 <<α  and 0>A  
This function have the following properties : ( ) 00 =RC ; ( ) 0' >dCR and ( ) 0'' >dCR . 
Note d  the commuting distance associated to the accepted job. The cost function is written : 
( )dCC R= . We then suppose that the search costs and the effective commuting costs are 
defined by the same functional form. Finally, if *d  is the optimal search distance, we have : 
( )*dCC R<   d*dd <<∀ 0    , .  
 
As two ways to obtain job offers are defined, the offer rate depends positively on the 
two strategies and is defined as follows :  
( )dba 000 += λγλ  
where γ  is the individual search efficiency and 0a and 0b  are two constants reflecting the 
impacts on the two search strategies on the offer rate. 
 
During the search, individuals can receive unemployment benefits, noted b. At each search 
sequence dt, the probability of receiving an offer is dtλ . Individuals can accept the offer and 
stop searching or refuse the offer and continue the search.  
 
 
2.2.  Equilibrium properties 
 
To determine both reservation wage, w*, and the optimal search distance, d*, we can 
solve the optimisation problem using the Bellman principle. Individuals are then assumed to 
maximise their future net income given the optimality of their decisions at each sequence. Let 
( )dCwW ,−  be the present expected value of stopping, accepting the offer w given  
commuting costs C , for a distance d , and working forever after at that wage. Let V the 
present  expected value of searching during the next pe**riod. Workers then stop the search if 
and only if ( )dCwWV ,*−= . 
When accepting an offer, individuals receive: 
 r
CwdCwW −=− ),(              (1) 
If individuals continue the search, they receive : 
[ ]{ } V
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dtVdCwWMax
rdt
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Multiplying by rdt+1 , we find : 
)()( wHrdCbrV R
λ+−=                             (3) 
where ( )dwwFwH
w∫
+∞
−=
*
1)(  
 
As ( )dba 000 += λγλ  and combining (1) and (3), we can obtain : 
( ) )()000(* wHr
dbawCbdRC
+
+−+=
λγ
           (4) 
 
By differentiating (4) and rearranging terms, we can define the following system : 
)(0)(' wH
r
b
dRC
γ
=  
(S)  
 *)(')000(
0
1)( wCbdRCdbab
dRC −+=+− λ   
The S system admits a unique solution, giving the reservation wage, w* and the optimal 
search distance d* , defined as follows (see appendix 1) :  
( ) α
α
γ
1
)1(
0*
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++−−+= αλα 1000
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dAdCbw     (6) 
We now turn to some comparative static properties of the exit rate from 
unemployment, given the  system (S). This exit rate, noted θ  , is defined as the product of the 
probability of receiving an offer (λ ) and the probability that the offered wage is greater than 
the reservation wage. It can then be written as : 
[ ])(1)000( wFdba −+= λγθ      (7) 
 
From the total differentiation of (7), the respective effects of 0λ  and d on the offer rate can be 
found. We then have : 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
0
000
0
00
0
*11 λλγλγγλ
θ
d
dwwfdba
d
ddwFbwFa
d
d
+−−+−=  (8) 
and ( )( ) ( ) ( ) dddwwfdbawFbddd *1 0000 +−−= λγγθ      (9) 
 
Relating the comparative static properties of (S) system (see appendix 2) to (8) and 
(9), we then conclude that the two search strategies have ambiguous effects on the exit rate. 
The equilibrium properties lead also to an indeterminacy in the impacts of exogenous 
variables, such as the spatial distances, x and y and the individual search efficiency, γ , on θ  
(see table 1 in appendix 2). 
 
3 – Data description and the choice of the spatial search area 
 
In order to estimate the structural parameters of the model, we exploit data from the 
TDE French survey (Trajectoires des Demandeurs d'Emploi) conducted by the Research 
Direction of the Employment Ministry (DARES). It concerns individuals who became 
unemployed in 1995 and interviewed each year until. Among these people, 60% are less than 
35 years old and 75% have a level of education below or equal to the secondary education 
level. The survey contains information about individual and household characteristics as well 
as spatial variables. 62% of the people live further than 8 miles from a job area, whereas 70% 
live near an ALE. Furthermore, 67% own vehicles. Over the survey period, 74% of the job 
seekers find a job. The median unemployment duration is about 10 months. During this search 
period, 63% of the inquired individuals have mobilised the ALE (passive search strategy). 
80% have adopted an active strategy by extending their job search area beyond the ALE area 
(i.e by moving or by increasing their residence-workplace distance) and then by searching 
through their network, market methods and private employment agencies.   
 
The existence of a selection bias in the choice of these two job search strategies can be 
suspected for two reasons. First, it may depend on individual attributes and spatial constraints. 
Second, the choice of each strategy can be conditioned by the access or not to an alternative 
one. So, before estimating the structural parameters of the model presented section 1, the 
choice process of the search strategies is analysed. The use of a bivariate probit model (with 
heteroscedasticity correction of White, 1982) allows us to test both the selectivity rule and the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. We have : 
 
ANPEi = β' 1i X1i + ε1i
PROSPi = β' 2i X2i + ε2i
 
 
 
 
where 
- X1 et X2  are vectors of explanatory variables, which may influence the decision of 
searching through the ALE (ANPEi) or the choice of extending the spatial job search area 
(PROSPi) 
-β1 et β2 provide the respective effects  on X1  et X2  
-ε1 et ε2  are residuals terms with ( ) ( )ρεε ,1,1,0,0, 21 N→  
 
The explanatory variables of the choice of using the passive job search strategy are the 
following : individual characteristics (gender, nationality, level of education), the quit cause of the 
previous job, unemployment benefits, the fact of having used the ALE to find the previous job, spatial 
criteria such as proximity to job area or to an ALE.  
In order to explain the active strategy use, we test the effect of individuals characteristics, 
family composition, active job search methods (network, market methods, and private employment 
agencies), the cause of job quit, income (getting housing benefits), commuting (to have a car or not) 
and localisation constraints.  
 
Fur purpose of presentation, the estimation results are provided in Appendix 3 (see table 2). 
These results first highlight that the independence of irrelevant alternatives is not rejected. 
The correlation coefficient between ε1 and ε2  is not significantly different from zero. We then 
conclude that people choose their job search strategy without taking into account the 
existence of alternative strategies.  
We now turn to the interpretation of the impacts of explanatory variables on choices. By 
reference to university level, having a primary or secondary level of education (DIPLO1 and 
DIPLO2) has a positive effect on the recourse to the ALE during the job search. Thus, this 
result confirms that the less-graduated people are more likely to search through the ALE, 
especially in France (Adnett, 1987; Lizé, 1997). Besides, the fact of having used the passive 
strategy to find the previous job (INTPUB) is positively linked with the probability of using 
this strategy in the present search period. This stresses a relative and individual specialisation 
in search strategies among search period. 
Alternative search methods to the ALE use influence the choice of the active search strategy. 
Using market methods or private employment agencies (reference : networks) increases the 
probability to extend the search area. People who search through the first two channels accept 
implicitly a higher mobility degree. 
Finally, we see that spatial constraints affect significantly the search strategies choice. Living 
near an ALE (variable x) increases the probability to have limited the search area to the ALE 
zone (passive strategy) and reduces the probability of widening the job search area (active 
strategy). In this case, job seekers have lower transport costs over their job search period. 
Although the distance to the job area (variable y) has no effect on the passive search strategy, 
it is determinant on the decision to extent the job search area. Moreover our results strengthen 
some empirical conclusions regarding the spatial mismatch. As Van den Berg and Gorter 
(1997), the higher is the number of children, the lower is the probability to adopt the active 
search strategy. In fact, it is all the more difficult to accept either longer commuting times as 
the family is large or as individuals have no car. Furthermore receiving housing benefits has a 
negative impact on the active search strategy choice.  
 
In sum, unemployed people do not choose randomly their search strategy. Many observable 
individual characteristics and especially spatial variables explain this choice. Besides, the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives is not rejected. In order to avoid selectivity bias, 
estimated probabilities (ANPEp and PROSPp) of using each strategy are computed and 
introduced as components of the offer rate in the estimation of the structural parameters of the 
model (Heckman et Robb, 1985).  
 
 
4. Results and comments 
 4.1. The method 
 
Because the active and passive search strategies have a theoretical ambiguous effect 
on exit rate, we estimate the structural parameters of the model defined in section 2. For that 
purpose, the likelihood function associated to the model must be determined, according to the 
assumptions made in section 2.1. 
As the search environment is stationary, an exponential distribution for individual 
unemployment duration, it , is specified. The right-censored observations are controlled by a 
dummy variable noted ic . When people leave unemployment, they can access a long-term job 
(issue 1), a short-term job (issue 2) or a subsidised job (issue 3). In order to take into account 
the issues' heterogeneity, we then defined a specific hazard rate for each destination, m,  
( 3,2,1=m ) and a binary variable, noted mid  and equal to 1 if individuals access the 
destination m. But, the estimation of a competing risks duration model can cause 
identification problems if too few explanatory factors are continuous (Han, Hausman,1990). 
In our study, we only have one continuous variable explaining duration : the wages. For 
purpose of identification and in the line of Lancaster (1990, pp.99-107), we assume that the 
issues are independent. With this assumption and insofar as exponential hazards are 
proportional, a likelihood function can be maximised for each destination, considering the 
other observations as censored. 
The theoretical model, as all the job search models, supposes that the offer rate 
depends only on the search behaviour. To overcome this restrictive hypothesis, we focus the 
empirical analysis on six different sub-samples defined according to three levels of diploma 
(DIPL1, DIPL2, DIPL3) and the fact of receiving or not unemployment benefits (INDEM=1 
or 0). Many works indeed underline the strong effect of these two factors on unemployment 
durations (see Meyer (1995) and Devine and Kiefer (1991) for a survey). Beyond observable 
characteristics, the presence of unobservable heterogeneity terms, iv , is tested. Adopting a 
Gamma distribution1 for the iv  effects, the hazard rate, θ , the density function ( )tf  and the 
survivor function ( )tS  are defined as follows (Greene, 1997, pp.995-996) :  
                                                 
1 v terms are distributed as a Gamma function with mean 1 and variance 
k
1
, then g v( ) = k
k
Γ k( )e
− kvvk−1  
θ i = θ i
f ti( ) = θ i 1 + 1k θ it i
 
 
 
 
−1
S ti( ) = 1+ 1k θ iti
 
 
 
 
− k
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       (10)
    
where 
k
1  is the Gamma variance 
 
Finally, we suppose that wages are distributed according to a log-logistic function with 
parameters ξ1  and ξ2  . This assumption allows us to test the existence of a threshold in the 
wages distribution. We then have: 
F wi( )= 1
1 + ξ1w1( )1ξ2
 
If ξ2 > 1, a threshold exists and is equal to:  
S =
ξ2 −1
ξ1
 
 
  
 
 
1ξ2
 
 
Integrating all these hypothesis, the log-likelihood function related to the m issue 
( 3,2,1=m ) is then given by:  
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Maximising this function for each issue and each sub-sample ensures to estimate the 
following coefficients : 
 - γ  the effect of individual search efficiency 
 - 0a  the impact of the passive search strategy (through public employment service) 
 - 0b  the effect of the active strategy  
 - ξ1  and ξ2 , the parameters of the wages distribution 
 - k
1 , the Gamma variance  
 
 4.2. Empirical results 
 
The estimation results for the model specified in (11) are reported in table 3. Note first that the 
Gamma variance is significantly different from zero for only two issues : the long-term jobs access 
and the subsidies jobs access. It then seems that individual unobservable terms influence the individual 
duration only for the "extreme" destinations, in terms of job stability.   
As expected, the unemployment duration decreases significantly with the individual 
search efficiency ( 0>γ ). But this impact is stronger for high levels of diploma, for stable 
issues and for people who do not receive unemployment compensations. 
 Table 3 : Empirical results from Gamma Duration Model 
 
  DIPL1 DIPL2 DIPL3 
  INDEM=1 INDEM=0 INDEM=1 INDEM=0 INDEM=1 INDEM=0 
  Coefficient T Student Coefficient T Student Coefficient T Student Coefficient T Student Coefficient T Student Coefficient TStudent 
a0 
b0 
γ 
ξ1 
ξ2 
1/k 
-0.003 
-2.087 
-0.601 
0.60 E-5 
1.102 
0.094 
-1.99** 
-2.65*** 
-1.97** 
1.89* 
1.94* 
2.01** 
-0.006 
-2.079 
-0.662 
0.61 E-5 
1.102 
0.101 
-2.05** 
-3.01*** 
-2.06** 
1.90* 
1.93* 
1.90* 
-0.018 
-2.283 
-0.708 
0.56 E-5 
1.101 
0.109 
-1.49ns 
-2.73*** 
-2.16** 
2.03** 
2.02** 
1.87* 
-0.002 
-2.301 
-0.720 
0.55 E-5 
1.101 
0.099 
1.52 ns 
-2.94*** 
-2.12** 
1.98** 
1.99** 
1.80* 
0.012 
-2.508 
-0.852 
0.50 E-5 
1.103 
0.099 
3.91*** 
-4.84*** 
-2.12** 
1.89* 
1.91* 
1.98** 
0.021 
-2.504 
-0.891 
0.49 E-5 
1.102 
0.100 
3.87*** 
-4.81*** 
-2.09** 
1.85* 
1.90* 
2.01** 
LONG 
TERM  
JOBS 
S 
LnL 
N 
6900.54 
-662.09 
482 
6797.81 
-798.53 
783 
7340.03 
-1901.65 
1152 
7461.14 
-2092.76 
1795 
8147.62 
-951.32 
764 
8449.34 
-1001.67 
802 
a0 
b0 
γ 
ξ1 
ξ2 
1/k 
-0.091 
-1.504 
-0.406 
0.63 E-5 
1.104 
0.003 
-2.21** 
-2.16** 
-2.81*** 
1.90* 
1.92* 
1.15 ns 
-0.089 
-1.418 
-0.421 
0.64 E-5 
1.105 
0.002 
-2.29** 
-2.21** 
-2.83*** 
1.91* 
1.93* 
1.19 ns 
-0.043 
-1.629 
-0.513 
0.60 E-5 
1.103 
0.027 
-2.44** 
-2.10** 
-2.18** 
1.77* 
1.91* 
1.10ns 
-0.040 
-1.638 
-0.545 
0.60 E-5 
1.104 
0.022 
-2.37** 
-2.12** 
-2.14** 
1.84* 
1.91* 
1.07ns 
-0.015 
-1.723 
-0.576 
0.58 E-5 
1.104 
0.002 
-2.42** 
-2.13** 
-1.99** 
1.82* 
1.95** 
1.12ns 
-0.016 
-1.752 
-0.591 
0.59 E-5 
1.103 
0.005 
-2.40** 
-2.18** 
-2.01** 
1.85* 
1.94* 
1.08ns 
SHORT 
TERM 
JOBS 
S 
LnL 
N 
6612.62 
-671.89 
482 
6523.61 
-792.35 
783 
6906.27 
-1899.97 
1152 
6911.42 
-2091.04 
1795 
7126.94 
-940.96 
764 
7012.32 
-939.18 
802 
a0 
b0 
γ 
ξ1 
ξ2 
1/k 
-3.997 
-0.006 
-0.056 
0.91 E-5 
1.110 
0.211 
-4.98*** 
-2.01** 
-2.09** 
1.91* 
1.93* 
2.68*** 
-4.009 
-0.004 
-0.081 
0.92 E-5 
1.109 
0.231 
-4.91*** 
-2.00** 
-2.11** 
1.90* 
1.92* 
2.59*** 
-1.012 
-0.367 
-0.099 
0.77 E-5 
1.108 
0.194 
-2.62*** 
-1.97** 
-2.03** 
1.89* 
1.90* 
2.75*** 
-1.005 
-0.370 
-0.157 
0.76 E-5 
1.109 
0.190 
-2.59*** 
-1.96** 
-2.01** 
1.90* 
1.92* 
2.69*** 
-0.201 
-0.621 
-0.186 
0.71 E-5 
1.107 
0.105 
-2.51*** 
-2.04** 
-1.97** 
1.88* 
1.85* 
2.45** 
-0.195 
-0.618 
-0.201 
0.70 E-5 
1.106 
0.112 
-2.57*** 
-2.08** 
-2.13** 
1.91* 
1.94* 
2.51*** 
SUBSIDISED 
JOBS 
S 
LnL 
N 
4762.05 
-672.99 
482 
4712.53 
-801.18 
783 
5529.93 
-1902.06 
1152 
5598.52 
-2100.09 
1795 
5946.72 
-902.83 
764 
6019.68 
-912.01 
802 
with : *** : significant at 1%; ** : significant at 5%; * : significant at 10%; ns : non significant 
NB1 : 0.60 E-5 = 0.0000060  NB2 : S = threshold in wages distribution 
We also see that 12 >ξ for all issues and sub-samples. This indicates that the offered 
wages distribution is not monotonically increasing. In the opposite, this distribution is 
increasing only until a threshold, S, and then it is decreasing. The threshold values can be 
computed for each sub-sample. This emphases that a relative hierarchy in wage thresholds 
exist according to issues after unemployment. Indeed, thresholds are positively related with 
the stability of the job found. For example, for low graduated people (DIPL1) who do not 
receive unemployment insurance, the estimated threshold is 31% higher when these people 
access to a full-term job than to a public measure. This result confirms that large wage 
disparities exist according to the type of labour contract found. 
 
The main contribution of the microeconometric results concerns the estimation of the 
two search strategies impacts, taking into account their selectivity rule. Indeed, estimations 
allows us to overcome the theoretical ambiguity concerning coefficients 0a  and 0b . Note first 
that the unemployment benefits have no impact on the relative efficiency of the two strategies.  
We see that the individual choice between active and passive search strategies, this 
choice being correlated with individual attributes but not with context (see section 3), has a 
strong effect on the individual duration and also on the job quality. Indeed, searching through 
the public service (passive strategy) and thus limiting the search area to the ALE zone is more 
efficient for low graduated people accessing a subsidised job. But, for the highest level of 
diploma and the access to long-term job, this strategy has a positive impact on duration. This 
result can be related to the specialisation of the French public employment agencies in two 
fields : the public measure access and the assistance for low-graduated people.   
At the same time, the alternative search strategy which consists in extending the search 
area using others search methods than the ALE decreases the unemployment duration, 
whatever the job found or the sub-sample studied. For all the unemployed people the search 
beyond the public employment agency area always beneficial. Despite higher search costs, 
this strategy then increases the offer rate and accelerate the exit from unemployment. This 
strategy seems even to be more efficient for high-graduated people accessing a full-term or a 
short-term job. 
 
5 – Conclusion 
This paper proposes a job search model where both spatial search area and reservation 
wage are assumed to be endogenous. As the equilibrium properties lead to an ambiguous 
effect of the spatial search area on the exit rate from unemployment, the structural parameters 
of the model are estimated. We exploit data from a French survey called Trajectoires des 
Demandeurs d'Emploi (TDE) conducted by Research Direction of Employment Ministry 
(DARES). The estimation of the search area choice by a bivariate probit model allow us to 
test the selectivity rule and the independence of irrelevant alternatives hypothesis.  
Moreover, our specification assumptions allow us to treat both individual and 
unobservable heterogeneity and the multiple destinations after unemployment. Three 
independent issues are analysed : long-term jobs, short-term jobs and subsidised jobs. 
Besides, estimations are carried out on sub-samples in which individuals are homogenous 
according to their level of diploma and their situation towards the unemployment insurance.  
 First, the econometric results show that the job seeker’s trade off between the two 
strategies is independent of the context but strongly determined by individual attributes and 
spatial constraints. Second, their choice has a strong impact on the job quality. Thus, the 
passive strategy (ALE) is more efficient for low-graduated people accessing a subsidised job. 
However, the active strategy (extending the job search area using others search methods than 
the ALE) is more efficient for high-graduated individuals accessing a full-term or a short-term 
job. We then conclude that the spatial constraints play an important role in the exit form 
unemployment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 : Equilibrium solutions  (w*, d*) from system S 
 
From  (S) we can write that : 
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According to first and second order conditions from (6) we have : 
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Where 

d is a threshold value of the spatial search distance corresponding to the inflexion 
point of the reservation wage function. So from (5) we obtain: 
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Under these conditions, the S system admits a unique solution (w*, d*). 
 
 
 Appendix 2 :  Comparative static results 
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Parameters 
  γ X Y 
 Exit rate (θ) + - + - + - 
Table 1 : Equilibrium comparative static properties of the model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 : The bivariate probit estimation results  
 
 
Table 2 : Choice Determinants of the search area 
 
 Coefficients T-ratio 
Passive Strategy : ANPE 
 
Constant 
FEMALE : female 
FRANC : French nationality 
DIPLO1  : primary education level 
DIPLO2 :  secondary education level 
DIPLO3 : university education level 
DEMIS :  quit last job 
LICEN: layoff 
INDEMCHO : receiving unemployment benefits  
CENTRE1 : living less than 8 miles from a job area 
CENTRE2 : living between 8 and 25 miles from a job area 
CENTRE3 : living further than 25 miles from a job area  
INTPUB : former job found through the ALE 
ANP1 : living less than 2 miles from an ALE  
ANP2 : living further than 2 miles from a ALE  
Job Area : 
POISSY 
CERGY 
MANTES 
AIX 
MARSEILLE 
ETANG 
LENS 
ROUBAIX 
 
 
0.047 
0.111 
-0.246 
0.145 
0.210 
réf. 
0.055 
réf. 
0.023 
réf. 
0.034 
0.110 
0.608 
0.199 
réf. 
 
-0.086 
-0.036 
ref. 
-0.113 
0.096 
ref. 
0.283 
ref. 
 
 
0.31ns 
1.91* 
-2.4** 
1.72* 
3.03*** 
 
0.60ns 
 
0.35ns 
 
0.33ns 
1.04ns 
6.12*** 
3.10*** 
 
 
-0.77ns 
-0.34ns 
 
-0.93ns 
0.62ns 
 
2.80*** 
Active strategy : PROSP 
Constant 
FEMALE : female 
FRANC : French nationality 
ENFANT : having children 
PROMAR : market methods  
ECOCON : entrance examination 
INTERI :    private employment agencies 
RESEAU :  social and professional network  
ALLOCLOG : receiving housing benefits 
CENTRE1 : living less than 8 miles from a job area 
CENTRE2 : living between 8 and 25 miles from a job area 
CENTRE3 : living further than 25 miles from a job area 
ANP1 : living less than 2 miles from an ALE  
ANP2 : living further than 2 miles from an ALE  
AUTO : having a car 
Job area : 
POISSY 
CERGY 
MANTES 
AIX 
MARSEILLE 
ETANG 
LENS 
ROUBAIX 
 
0.704 
-0.097 
-0.118 
-0.131 
0.208 
0.102 
0.229 
réf. 
-0.203 
réf. 
0.246 
0.342 
-0.274 
réf. 
0.164 
 
0.238 
0.425 
ref. 
-0.283 
0.048 
ref. 
0.290 
ref. 
 
3.54*** 
-1.46 ns  
-1.01 ns  
-1.68* 
2.25** 
0.46 ns  
2.85*** 
 
-2.97*** 
 
2.16** 
2.92*** 
-3.54*** 
 
2.23** 
 
1.80* 
3.22*** 
 
-2.16** 
0.27 ns  
 
2.73*** 
ρ -0.0091 -0.22ns 
Log-likelihood 
Number of observations 
-2278.75 
2022 
with : *** : significant at 1%; ** : significant at 5%; * : significant at 10%; ns : non significant 
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